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1 Introduction
Contests are present in many areas of human a¤airs. In interstate and civil
wars, patent races, advertising or sport competitions, a set of actors strive
to obtain an object or honour that will award them some benets. In these
struggles, contenders often expend staggering amounts of resources. Econo-
mists are naturally interested in contests both because of their allocative
implications and because of the impact of the intensity of these competi-
tions on social welfare.1
Despite its relevance and ubiquitous nature it is only recently that con-
test theory has become part of mainstream Economics. One important
reason for this has been the great reliance of contest theory on a particular
construct: The Contest Success Function (Hirshleifer, 1989). This function
is a mapping from the e¤orts made by contenders into their probability of
attaining victory or, under risk neutrality, to their share of the contested ob-
ject. However, the CSF has often been seen as too much of a black-box. For
instance, the widely-used Tullock form (Tullock, 1967) under which winning
probabilities (or shares) depend on relative e¤orts may seem sensible but
there is no a priori reason why it should govern the wide array of contests
listed above. Therefore, the predictions of contests models could be seen as
too reliant on (at rst glance) very specic functional forms rather than on
sound economic principles.
This view is somehow unfair for two reasons: Firstly, because there are
other areas of Economics such as production theory where very specic func-
tional forms are often assumed . Secondly, because in the last few years there
has been an active and fruitful strand of the literature which has provided a
wide variety of foundations to the most frequently employed CSFs.2 Other
contributions have studied the econometric estimation of these functions.3
As a result, economists have now at their disposal a growing menu of well-
founded CSFs to chose from when studying a particular contest. The issue
then becomes which type of CSF is better suited to each application.
One family of contests assumes that winning probabilities depend on the
di¤erence between the e¤ective e¤orts of the contenders. These di¤erence-
form contests, introduced in Hirshleifer (1989; 1991), were rst explored
by Baik (1998) and Che and Gale (2000). One distinguished feature of
1For excellent surveys of the contest literature see Corchón (2007) and Konrad (2009).
2These characterizations fall into four main categories: Axiomatic, stochastic,
optimally-designed and microfounded (Jia, Skaperdas and Vaidya, 2013).
3For a detailed discussion of the econometric issues involved in the estimation of CSFs
see Jia and Skaperdas (2011) and Jia et al. (2013).
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the di¤erence-form CSFs is that if contenders expend zero e¤ort they can
still enjoy a positive winning probability. Hirshleifer (1991) argues that
this feature applies very well to contests with important frictions, such as
incomplete information, exhaustion or rugged terrain. Naval combat is also
prone to display this feature: severe storms almost obliterated the Persian
navy in 480 BC, the Mongol navy in 1281 and the Spanish Armada in
1588; as a result, Greece, Japan and the England respectively prevailed by
making virtually no defensive e¤ort. Hirshleifer (2000) also argues that the
di¤erence-form CSF is well-suited to model union-management conict; even
when the union is in a overwhelmingly dominant position, it will refrain from
imposing draconian terms on the management because it is in its interest
to keep the rm in business. We also see the di¤erence-form to be well
suited for the study of inuence activities within organizations (Milgrom,
1988) and within federations (Wärneryd, 1998). Under the interpretation
of the CSF as a share, it is di¢ cult to imagine that exerting no inuence
e¤ort precludes an employee from receiving any rents from her employer or
a region from receiving any transfer from the federal government.
In addition, di¤erence-form CSFs have been shown to emerge naturally
in a number of settings. Gersbach and Haller (2009) show that a simple
di¤erence-form CSF is the result of intra-household bargaining when part-
ners must decide how much time to devote to themselves or to their partner.
Corchon and Dahm (2010) microfound a particular type of di¤erence-form
CSF as the result of a game where contenders are uncertain about the type of
the external decider; by interpreting the CSF as a share, they also show that
the di¤erence-form coincides with the claim-egalitarian solution in bargain-
ing. Corchon and Dahm (2011) obtain this form as the result of a problem
where the contest designer is unable to commit to a specic CSF once con-
tenders have already exerted their e¤orts. Skaperdas and Vaydia (2012)
show that the di¤erence-form CSF can be derived in a Bayesian framework
in which contenders produce evidence stochastically in order to persuade
an audience of the correctness of their respective views. Finally, Polishchuk
and Tonis (2013) show that a non linear di¤erence-form CSF is the result of
using a mechanism design approach when contestants have private informa-
tion over their valuation of victory. In summary, it is fair to conclude that
di¤erence-form contests are both well-founded and well suited for a number
of relevant applications.
The present paper o¤ers a systematic study of di¤erence-form group
contests, that is, contests fought among groups whose winning probabilities
depend on the di¤erence between their e¤ective e¤orts. This type of group
contests have not been studied before in the literature.
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First, we perform the equilibrium analysis of the di¤erence-form group
contests. We employ a specic functional form of the CSF. In this form,
the impact function of the groups mapping their e¤orts into e¤ective ef-
forts is reminiscent of the index of absolute inequality introduced by Kolm
(1976a,b) and characterized by Blackorby and Donaldson (1980). We also
assume the cost function of e¤orts to be exponential; this functional form,
to the best of our knowledge, has not been employed in the contest liter-
ature before. This function encompasses as a particular case the case of
linear costs, the only one considered so far in the study of di¤erence-form
contests. We start by analyzing the case of homogeneous groups, that is,
when membersvaluations of victory are the same within each group. We
show that the non-existence of pure strategy equilibria and the monopo-
lization results obtained in the literature depend critically on the linearity
assumption. Monopolization (a term coined by Nitzan, 1991) refers to the
feature that in equilibrium at most one contender is active, i.e. expends
positive e¤ort. This feature is a well known result in the contest literature.
However, we show that as soon as the cost function becomes strictly convex
more than one group can be active in equilibrium. Still, it can be the case
that not all groups are active.4 This depends on whether the valuation of
the victory by the group is above a certain activity threshold. One force
driving this result is that, as mentioned above, groups can enjoy a positive
winning probability even if inactive. Only if they value victory intensely
enough will they become active.
Second, we consider the case of heterogeneous groups. Our purpose there
is two answer two questions: 1) Are more egalitarian groups relatively more
successful in these contests?; and 2) would groups benet from internal
redistribution? This case is quite complex to solve but the picture that
emerges from the analysis shows that egalitarianism is never bad for the
group. However, redistribution that takes place below the activity threshold
may have no impact on the chances of victory of the group. Progressive
redistribution above that line or such that some inactive members become
active does indeed enhance the prospects of the group in the contest.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we present a family
of di¤erence-form group contests. Section 3 and 4 analyze the cases of homo-
geneous and heterogeneous group valuations respectively. Section 5 tackles
the issue of inequality and redistribution within groups. We summarize and
o¤er some further remarks in Section 6.
4This is similar to the phenomenon of oligopolization which emerges in group contests
under the Tullock CSFs and linear costs (Hillman and Riley, 1989; Ueda, 2002).
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2 The contest game
Let us consider a society divided in K  2 disjoint groups formed by a num-
ber nk  1 of individuals each. The total number of individuals in society is
n: Denote the set of groups by K: These K groups are in competition. They
are engaged in a contest which can have a sole winner. Members of these
groups can expend non-negative e¤ort in order to help their group to win
the contest. Depending on the type of contest, these e¤orts can be money,
time or weapons. Denote by xk = fx1k; :::; xnkkg the vector of e¤orts in
group k and by x the vector (x1; :::;xK).
E¤orts determine the winning probability of each group according to
a Contest Success Function (CSF) denoted by pk : Rn+! R+: Under risk
neutrality pk(x) can be thought of as the share of the prize associated to
victory that group k obtains. However, for most of the paper, we will favor
the former interpretation of the CSF.
The constest success function (CSF) that we use is dened as follows
pk(x) =max
(
min
(
1
K
+ hk(xk)  1
K
sX
l=1
hl(xl); 1
)
; 0
)
for any x;
(1)
where hk() is called the impact funtion of group k and it is given by
hk(xk) = ln (
1
nk
nkX
i=1
e kxik) 

k for k  0,  > 0: (2)
The di¤erence-form group CSF in (1) relates the success of a group to
the di¤erence between its impact and the average impact of all the groups
involved in the contest. If its impact is above (below) the average, its winning
probability is above (below) the winning probability the group would be
awarded under a fair lottery.
The CSF in (1) generalizes the di¤erence-form function analyzed in Che
and Gale (2000) to the case of multi-group contests. Similar CSFs are
microfounded in Corchón and Dahm (2010), Skaperdas and Vaidya (2012)
and Polishchuk and Tonis (2013).
The impact function (2) is inspired by the measures of absolute inequal-
ity introduced by Pollak (1971) and Kolm (1976a,b) and axiomatized by
Blackorby and Donaldson (1980). The parameter  can be seen as a mea-
sure of the returns to scale of e¤ort. On the other hand, the parameter
5
k 2 [0;1) measures the complementarity of exponential e¤orts5. When k
approaches zero the impact of a group becomes just the sum of its mem-
berse¤orts, i.e. h(xk) =
Pnk
i=1 xik; this is the linear case considered in Che
and Gale (2000) and Corchon and Dahm (2011). When k ! 1 then
h(xk) =nk minfx1k; :::; xnkkg; which corresponds to the weakest-link tech-
nology explored in contests of the ratio form by Lee (2012).6 The latter case
is the only one in which the function hk(xk) is not strictly increasing. Fi-
nally, observe that we are assuming our CSF to be anonymous within groups
(Münster, 2009). That is, all members of all groups are equally e¢ cient in
transforming e¤orts into impact in the contest.
Let us now study the strategic interaction of the K groups in our society
which are engaged in a contest. Victory in this confrontation can be inter-
preted as providing the group with a prize, territory, pool of resources or the
right to implement a particular policy. Group members are heterogeneous
in their valuation of the victory of their group. Denote by yik the payo¤
that a member i of group k obtains in case her group attains victory in the
contest. Depending on the interpretation of victory, the prole of valuations
yk= (y1k;...,ynkk) can be seen as a binding agreement on the distribution of
the object being contested (as in Cubel and Sanchez-Pages, 2013) or as the
intensity of membersfeelings about the policy the group will implement in
case it prevails (as in Esteban and Ray, 2011). We assume the valuation of
defeat in the contest to be equal to zero.
Plugging the impact function (2) in (1) yields the group winning proba-
bility
pk =
1
K
+ ln (
1
nk
nkX
i=1
e kxik) 
nk
k   1
K
sX
l=1
ln (
1
nl
nlX
i=1
e lxil) 
nl
l :
Note that a group can have a positive probability of victory even if all
its members remain inactive.
Memberse¤orts are costly. Their cost is given by the following expo-
nential cost function:
c(xik) =
exik   1

for  > 0: (3)
The parameter  measures the convexity of the cost, or in other words,
the speed at which the marginal cost of e¤ort increases. To the best of our
5 Impact functions which allow for di¤erent degrees of complementarity were rst used
by Kolmar and Rommeswinkel (2013).
6Weakest-link type of technologies in collective action problems were rst considered
by Hirshleifer (1983).
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knowledge we are the rst to employ this family of cost functions. Note that
it encompasses as a particular case the linear cost function employed in all
the previous studies of contests with di¤erence-form CSF, i.e.  ! 0. For
any value of , however, observe that c0(0) = 1. As we will see below, this
is the ultimate reason why players can remain inactive in a pure-strategy
equilibrium.
Summarizing, the payo¤ of a member i of group k is given by
uik(x) = pk(x)yik   c(xik): (4)
We now look for the Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies of this contest
game where members decide how much e¤ort to contribute to the success
of their group whilst taking as given the e¤ort of outsiders and their fellow
group members. We will refer to this simply as the equilibrium.
Note on linear e¤orts: The contest game presented above with expo-
nential e¤orts is equivalent to a game with linear e¤orts where {ik = exik
imposing the restriction of {ik > 1:7 The impact function in (2) would then
become the log of a CES function aggregating memberse¤orts. Contribu-
tion to the contest would then require a minimum investment. This would
correspond for instance to armed conicts in the Antiquity and the Middle
Age where soldiers where supposed to show up in the battleeld with their
own equipment. That of course meant that typically only the wealthier
members of society could a¤ord to ght war (Finer, 1975).
3 Homogeneous groups
As a rst step in our analysis, let start by exploring the case of homogeneous
groups, that is, the case where all members of the same group have the same
valuation of victory, denoted by yk: This encompasses as a particular case the
case of indidividual contests, i.e. nk = 1 for all k: As expected then, under
linearity of the cost function we obtain the monopolization result found by
Baik (1998) and Che and Gale (2000): At most one group is inactive in
equilibrium. When the cost is strictly convex, though, it is possible to have
more than one group active in equilibrium, even all of them.
Let us rst write down the FOC resulting from maximizing the payo¤
function (4) and assuming that in equilibrium no group wins for certain:
@uik
@xik
= 
K   1
K
e kxikPnk
j=1 e
 kxjk n

kyik   exik = 0: (5)
7We thank Alberto Vesperoni for pointing this equivalence to us.
7
Note that the SOC condition for the problem ensures its concavity:
@2uik
@2xik
=  K   1
K
ke
 kxikP
j 6=i e
 kxjk
(
Pnk
j=1 e
 kxjk)2
nkyik   exik < 0:
The marginal benet of exerting e¤ort is thus decreasing. This feature
will play an important role in our characterization of the equilibrium.
3.1: Linear cost: Let us assume, as the rest of the literature on di¤erence-
form contests, that the cost of e¤ort is linear, i.e.  = 0: For the sake of
exposition we will assume for the rest of the paper the case  = 0: It will be
useful to denote eyk = yknk : Without loss of generality, let us index groups in
society decreasingly in their value of eyk so eyk > eyl for k < l:
Assuming cost linearity, expression (5) boils down to

K   1
K
e kxikPnk
j=1 e
 kxjk yk = 1 for all k 2 K
Note that the left hand side in this expression is decreasing in xik there
cannot exist a generic equilibrium in which the above holds for some mem-
bers and @uik@xik < 0 for the rest. The only two remaining porssibilities are
that i) @uik@xik < 0 for all members; or ii)
@uik
@xik
 0 for all members and pk = 1:
It will be very convenient for us to denote the threshold.
z  1

K
K   1 :
It is clear to see that the type i) of equilibrium within a group can only
occur if eyk < z: This activity threshold is decreasing in the e¤ectiveness
of e¤ort  and in the number of groups K: Hence, a group is more likely
to be above it the more e¤ective e¤ort is and the higher the number of
rival groups. On the other hand, the type ii) of equilibrium necessarily
involves that at most one group can be active. The following Proposition
characterizes existence of such equilibria.
Proposition 1 Assume valuations of victory are homogeneous within groups.
If ey1 < z no group is active in equilibrium. Otherwise, a pure strategy equilib-
rium exists if and only if ey2 < z: In that case, only group 1 is active, multiple
equilibria exist and any equilibrium e¤ort prole x1 satises h1(x1) = 1 so
p1(x
) = 1:
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Proof. For the rst statement note that
1 >
eyk
z
= 
K   1
K
yk
nk
> 
K   1
K
e kxik
nk   1 + e kxik yk;
so no member would like to deviate and become active. When ey1 < z this
applies to all groups. This is the unique equilibrium in this case because
there no member could enjoy a higher marginal benet of e¤ort by becoming
active. Now consider an equilibrium where some or all members in at least
one group are active. It must then be of the type ii): For that it must be
that e kxik=
Pnk
j=1 e
 kxjk > 1nk for all active members and that pk = 1:
Otherwise, all members, including the inactive ones, would like to increase
their e¤ort. If this is the case for more than one group, this cannot constitute
a pure-strategy equilibrium. Hence, it must be that all groups except group
1 remain inactive, i.e. y2 < z, and group 1 wins the contest for certain. For
this to be the case
h1(x

1) = ln (
1
n1
n1X
j=1
e 1x

j1)
  
1 = 1,
n1X
j=1
e 1x

j1 = n1e
  1
 (6)
This can be attained through multiple strategy proles, including some
in which a number of members remain inactive. In any case, it must be that
for the active members
e 1xi1Pn1
j=1 e
 1xj1
y1
z
 1:
Not that ey1 > z implies that one of these proles is the one where all
members make the same e¤ort x1 =
1
n1
:
This result extends the one in Baik (1998) and Che and Gale (2000)
to the case of homogeneous groups: In di¤erence-form contests with linear
costs, at most one contender is active. For this result to hold, linear e¤ort is
critical. Because it is constant, groups with a su¢ ciently high valuation of
victory would like to contribute as much e¤ort as possible. Hence, the lack
of pure strategy equilibria. Only when there is one such a group an equi-
librium in pure strategies can emerge. Even in that case, the assumption of
constant marginal cost induces a multiplicity of equilibria where members
contribute di¤erent amounts of e¤ort but victory is in any case guaranteed.
3.2 Strictly convex cost: Despite its prevalence in contest theory, linear
costs might not describe best the cost of e¤ort in confrontations. When
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e¤ort is time or money that must be raised in imperfectly competitive mar-
kets, its cost is very likely to be convex. In sport contests, fatigue makes
e¤ort increasingly costly; Brow and Minor (2011) show that this is the case
in professional tennis. Moreover, the predictions derived from linear cost
models can be rather non-robust. Esteban and Ray (2001) showed that
the well-known "Olson paradox" is the result of a rather particular set of
assumptions. It does not hold when the cost of collective action becomes
convex enough. Next we will see that this is also the case in di¤erence-form
contests. The one-sidedness result so emphasized in the contest literature
no longer holds when the marginal cost of e¤ort is strictly increasing.
To obtain that result, it is important to note rst that for any two active
members i and j for who (5) holds it must be that xik = x

jk: Hence, if at
least one member equilibrium e¤ort is an interior optimum that must be so
for all other members. This implies that a necessary condition for a group to
be active in equilibrium is eyk > z: Let us now dene the following censored
group income distribution as ey; whose elements are dened as:
eyk = maxfz; eykg:
Let us denote by eG the geometric mean of the censored group incomes,
i.e. eG = ( KY
l=1
eyl ) 1K : The following Proposition characterizes the equilibrium
and the equilibrium winning probabilities in this contest.
Proposition 2 Assume homogenous valuations of victory within groups
and strictly convex cost of e¤ort. If y1 > ezG only group 1 is active
in equilibrium. Otherwise, group k is active in equilibrium if and only if
eyk > maxfz; e  K eGg (7)
In that case; the equilibrium winning probabilities are equal to:
pk = maxf0;
1
K
+


ln
eykeG g:
Proof. For an active group, the equilibrium individual e¤ort must be equal
to
xk =
1

ln
eyk
z
:
For this to constitute an equilibrium it must be that eykz > 1; that is,
the familiar eyk > z: For the groups for which (5) holds, their impact boils
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down to hk(xk) =

 ln
eyk
z : For an inactive group note that its impact can be
written as hk(xk) =

 ln
eyk
z = 0: Then
pk =
1
K
+


ln
eyk
z
  1
K


KX
l=1
ln
eyl
z

=
1
K
+


ln
eyk
z
  1
K


ln
 
KY
l=1
eyl
z
!
=
1
K
+


[ln
eyk
z
+ ln
z
(
KY
l=1
eyl ) 1K
];
which is the expression stated in the text of the Proposition. For that
probability to be positive for an active group it must be that pk > 0, which
requires eyk > e  KG. This together with the condition eyk > z implies
condition (7). On the other hand, simple calculations show that p1 < 1 if
and only if ey1 < ez eG: Otherwise, group 1 wins with probability one and
no other group is active. This is because even by exerting optimal e¤ort
xk their probability of winning remains equal to zero. So ey1 < ezG is a
necessary condition for more than one group to be active in equilibrium.
It is important to observe the stark contrast between Propositions 1.1
and 1.2. In the former, at most one group is active in equilibrium whereas in
the latter case, multiple active groups are possible. Moreover, equilibrium
existence with linear cost is ensured only if the ey2 is su¢ ciently low, whereas
with strictly convex cost, a su¢ ciently high ey2 ensures that at least two
groups are active in equilibrium. Still, it remains true that a group valuation
of victory must be high enough for it to be active. This is due to the fact
that under the di¤erence-form CSF a group can prevail even if it remains
inactive. This should be seen as a realistic outcome. Not all groups in
society engage in confrontation nor all employees in organisations engage
in inuence activities. Only those with a su¢ ciently intense preference for
victory.
4 Heterogeneous groups
Let us now consider the case of heterogenous groups. From now, we will
be interested in the following two questions. First, how the level of hetero-
geneity or inequality a¤ects the winning probability of a group. Secondly,
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we will be interested in whether groups would be interested in engaging in
self-enforcing redistribution in order to enhance their chances of prevailing
in the contest. In this section, we characterize the equilibria of the contest
when valuations are heterogeneous and show that they display a number of
appealing features. In the following section, we answer the two questions
just mentioned.
First, when measuring heterogeneity within groups we will make exten-
sive use of generalized means (Hardy et al, 1934). These are dened as
yrk = [
1
nk
nkX
j=1
yrkjk ]
1
rk for rk 2 R; rk 6= 0; (8)
and as the geometric mean for rk = 0: The case rk = 1 corresponds to the
arithmetic mean and rk =  1 to the harmonic mean. Moreover, for any
given vector, yrk is increasing in rk:
Now, let us turn our attention to the FOC of this problem. Let us
order members in decreasing order so yik > yjk for i < j: Because members
di¤er in income, it might be the case that some members remain inactive
in equilibrium. If this is the case, because the marginal benet of e¤ort is
decreasing, it must be that if xik = 0 and x

jk > 0 then yjk > yik: Then,
expression (5) becomes:
@uik
@xik
=
e kxik
nk   nk +
Pnk
j=1 e
 kxjk
yik
z
  exik = 0; (9)
where nk is the number of active members. Unfortunately, this expression
renders impossible to solve the system of FOCs beyond some particular
cases. Still, there a relevant particular cases where closed form solutions are
possible.
4.1 All groups fully (in)active: We will refer to a group whose all mem-
bers are active (inactive) as a fully active (inactive) group. Let us now
characterize the conditions under which all groups are either active or inac-
tive in equilibrium. Note that for any two members i and j, their optimal
e¤ort choices satisfy
exik
exjk
= (
yik
yjk
)
1
+k :
This implies that membersoptimal e¤orts become more similar as e¤orts
become more complementary or the cost function more convex. Adding up
12
the FOCs for all members yields
nkX
j=1
e kxjk =
0@ nkX
j=1
y
 k
+k
jk
1A
+k

z
k
 ;
which we then plug back in (5) to obtain
xik = ln[
yik
z
]
1
+k   1

ln[
nkX
j=1
(
yik
z
)
 k
+k ];
A necessary condition for this equilibrium to exist is then that the cost of
e¤ort must be strictly convex, i.e.  > 0: Now denote rk =   k+k 2 ( 1; 0]
and by yrk the mean income of order rk as in (8). Similarly to above, it will
be useful from now on to employ the vector of censored group incomes y
whose elements are given by
y
k
= maxfyrk
nk
; zg:
Again, and without loss of generality, let us index groups in a decreasing
manner according to y
k
and denote by Gr the geometric mean of censored
groups incomes in y; i.e. Gr = (
KY
l=1
y
l
)
1
K : The following Proposition charac-
terizes under which condition this type of equilibrium exists and the winning
probabilities under it.
Proposition 3 Assume yr1 < e
zGr : Then for each group k there exists an
income threshold byk  nkz[ yrk
nkz
]
rk
1+rk
such that an equilibrium in which all groups are either fully active or fully
inactive exists if and only if for at least one group ynkk > byk and y1k < byk
for the rest of groups. In that case, equilibrium winning probabilities are
equal to
pk = maxf0;
1
K
+


ln
yrk
Gr
g: (10)
Proof. First of all, note that for a member to be active in equilibrium it
must be that xik > 0 so
yik
z
> [
nkX
j=1
(
yjk
z
)
 k
+k ]
+k
 , yik
nkz
> [
1
nk
nkX
j=1
(
yjk
nkz
)rk ]
1
1+rk , yik > byk:
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For this to hold for all members, it must hold for member nk: Because
ynkk  yrk ; the fact that
ynkk
nkz
> [
yrk
nkz
]
rk
1+rk implies that
yrk
nkz
> 1; or in other
words that yk =
yrk
nk
: On the other hand, if it does not hold for member 1
of the group, that group will be fully inactive. By the same token, it must
be that
yrk
nkz
< 1 so yk = z: So we can write a group impact simply as
hk(x

k) =


ln
yrk
z
:
Plugging the resulting impact into (1) yields the following winning prob-
ability for an active group.
pk =
1
K
+


ln
yrk
z
  1
K
KX
l=1


ln
yrl
z
=
1
K
+


ln
yrl
z
(
KY
l=1
yrl
z )
1
K
;
which is the expression stated in the text of the Proposition. It is easy to
obtain then that for group 1, p1 < 1 if and only if y1 < ezGr :
This Proposition shows that success of a group in the contest is related
to the relationship between its mean income group and the average of all
mean group incomes. Note that because rk =   k+k is decreasing in k; the
impact of the group decreases as e¤orts become more complementary. This
is because complementarity makes the e¤ort of the low valuation members
more critical. These are the members with the lowest incentive to contribute
so as the group becomes more dependent on them its chances of prevailing
become smaller.
A common criticism of di¤erence-form CSFs is that they are not scale
independent, that is, they are not homogeneous of degree zero. Changing
the unit of measurement of e¤ort from soldiers to battalions or from dollars
to euros, changes the relative success of contenders (Alcalde and Dahm,
2007; Corchon, 2007; Bevia and Corchon, 2012). Although the di¤erence-
form CSF we employ is indeed not homogeneous of degree zero, inspection
of (10) shows that measurement units do not matter locally in equilibrium.
Corollary 4 (Group scale invariance) Consider an equiproportional
change on all group valuations such that no inactive group becomes active
nor viceversa. Then equilibrium winning probabilities remain unchanged.
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Recall that generalized means are homogeneous of degree one, i.e. yrk("yk)
= "yrk(yk) for " > 0: Hence, for local homogeneity of degree zero to hold it
must be that "  yrK+1 < z; where K + 1 is the fully inactive group with
the highest group mean income. Hence, our di¤erence-form group contests
su¤er less severely from the problem of scale dependence, at least in equi-
librium, that plague other di¤erence-form contests.
4.2 Linear impact: The case k = 0 for all k corresponds to the case
studied by Che and Gale (2000) and derived by Corchon and Dahm (2011)
where the impact function is just linear. In that case,
hk(xk) =

nk
nkX
j=1
xjk:
Note that because the CSF is separable and the marginal impact of e¤ort
is a constant nk , any equilibrium must be in dominant strategies.
The FOC in (9) implies that the optimal e¤ort choice of an active member
is:
xik =
1

ln
yik
nkz
;
so a member is active if and only if yik > nkz: This determines the set of
active members: It consists of the nk members whose valuations are above
nkz: As above dene the vector of censored valuations yk as the one whose
elements are yik = maxfyiknk ; zg: Finally denote as k = argmaxfGkg where
Gk is the geometric group mean of the censored valuations.
Proposition 5 Assume Gk < e
zG where G = (
KY
l=1
Gl )
1
K : Then in equi-
librium the group winning probabilities are given by
pk = maxf0;
1
K
+


ln
Gk
G
g: (11)
Proof. Plugging the optimal choice in the impact function yields:
hk(x

k) =

nk
nkX
i=1
ln
yik
z
=


8<:ln(
nkY
j=1
yjk)
1
nk   ln z
9=; =  flnGk   ln zg :
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So winning probabilities become.
pk =
1
K
+


flnGk   ln zg  
1
K


KX
l=1
flnGl   ln zg
=
1
K
+


flnGk  
1
K
KX
l=1
lnGl g =
1
K
+


ln
Gk
(
KY
l=1
Gl )
1
K
:
For this probability to be smaller than 1 it must be that for k =
argmaxfGkg it holds that Gk < ezG:
By simplifying on the technological side, this case illustrates perfectly
well that the relative success of the group depends on the relative position
of its mean valuation with respect to the mean of the mean group valuations.
In the particular case of linear impact functions, these means are geometric
means. Groups with more active members, that is, with more members
whose valuation is above the activity threshold nkz are more successful in
the contest. Moreover, changes in valuations which imply that no additional
member jumps above the threshold have no impact on the success of the
group. It can be seen then that local scale invariance also holds as well in
this case:
Corollary 6 (Member scale invariance) Consider an equiproportional
change on all valuations such that no member no inactive group become
active nor viceversa. Then equilibrium winning probabilities remain un-
changed.
The requirements for local invariance in measurement units to hold are
stronger than before. Now it must be the case that " > 0 is such that
" < minf nkzyn
k
+1k
gKk=1, where recall that nk + 1 is the inactive member with
the highest valuation.
4.3 Linear costs: As we saw in the previous Section, the assumption
of linear costs can lead to non-robust predictions. However, as we will
see, under heterogeneity in individual valuations of victory this problem is
ameliorated. More importantly, the linearity assumption allows us to derive
closed form solutions when groups are not fully active in equilibrium.
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Taking expression (9) and adding it up for all active members yields:
nkX
j=1
e kxik =
nk   nk
Hk
znk
  1
; (12)
where Hk =
nkPn
k
j=1
1
yik
is the harmonic mean of the individual valuations of
the active members in group k:
Combining this with the expression (9) one obtains that
xik = ln[yik
Hk
znk
  1
(nk   nk)
Hk
nk
]
1
k , yik > nk   n

k
1
z  
nk
Hk
So the set of active members is given by all members for who the above
holds. These must be the nk members with the highest valuation since recall
that if xik = 0 and x

jk > 0 then yjk > yik: So for a group to have at least
one active member y1k > nkz: On the other hand, if for at least two groups
all their members want to be active, we go back to the non-existence result
in Proposition 1.2. For this not to be the case it is needed that in all groups
at least one agent must want to remain inactive so
ynkk <
1
1
z  
Pnk 1
j=1 yjk
: (13)
if this condition does not hold for at least two groups, these groups would
want to be fully active and we go back to the non-existence result in Propo-
sition 1.1. Let us assume that this condition is satised. Before that it
will be useful to dene uk =
nk nk
nk
as the inactivity rate of group k and as
ak = 1  zn

k
Hk
the activity gap of group k: The inactivity rate is the propor-
tion of members in k who remain inactive. The activity gap measures by
how much the harmonic mean of valuations for active members is above the
activity threshold znk:
Proposition 7 Under linear costs, assuming that k =  for all k and that
(13) holds for all groups there exists an equilibrium where nk < nk members
are active in each group and under which winning probabilities are equal to
pk =
1
K
+


ln
ak
Ga
  

ln
uk
Gu
;
where Ga and Gu are the geometric mean of the inactivity rates and the
activity gaps respectively.
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Proof. Using (12) to compute the impact of a group yields:
hk(x

k) = ln[
1
nk
(nk   nk +
nkX
j=1
e kxik)] 

k =   
k
ln[
nk   nk
nk
Hk
znk
Hk
znk
  1
]
=

k
ln[
1  znkHk
1  nknk
] =

k
ln
ak
uk
Note that for a fully inactive group, i.e. nk = 0; its impact is hk(xk) = 0:
The winning probabilities then become
pk =
1
K
+ ln[
ak
uk
]
1
k  
K
KX
l=1
ln[
al
ul
]
1
l =
1
K
+ ln
a
1
k
k
[
KY
l=1
a
1
l
l ]
1
K
  ln u
1
k
k
[
KY
l=1
u
1
l
l ]
1
K
;
which yields the expression stated in the text of the Proposition under the
assumption that k =  for all k.
Although the analysis of the contest becomes quite intrincate at this
point, this result shows that it is still possible to derive predictions on the
relative success of groups. Groups with higher activity gaps and lower in-
activity rates should have higher chances of prevailing. Both are not inde-
pendent but it is possible to see that for two groups with the same activity
gap, the one with the lower inactivity rate should be more likely to attain
victory. Similarly, for two groups with the same number of active members,
the more likely to prevail should be the one with the highest harmonic mean
Hk and the highest size nk.
5 Inequality and redistribution
We are nally in the position to answer our two previous questions: First,
whether inequality helps or hinders groups in di¤erence-form contests. And
second, to what extent redistribution can help them to enhance their chances
of prevailing. In order to tackle this second question we must thus assume
that these valuations represent the income that members must defend from
outsiders or the claims they have over the object being contested. In that
case, it is meaningful to talk about redistribution.
The standard concept to use when dealing with inequality is the Pigou-
Dalton Principle: It is a well-known and widely-employed criterion used to
rank distributions by their level of inequality.
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Denition 8 (Pigou-Dalton transfer principle) Take two vectors yk
and y0k, where y
0
k is obtained by adding  > 0 to yik and substracting it from
yjk where yik < yjk and such that yik   < yjk  : Then the distribution
y0k is less unequal than yk.
This principle states that a rank-preserving progressive transfer can-
not increase inequality. Note that a progressive transfer makes the original
distribution to be majorized by the new one. Because means of order r are
Schur-concave when r  1; a Pigou-Dalton transfer increases yr for all. That
is why means of order r are commonly employed in the inequality measure-
ment literature. Note that this property applies to our context since for all
groups rk 2 ( 1; 0]:
Proposition 9 (Redistribution) Consider contests with heterogeneous
groups with linear impact functions or in which all groups are either fully
active or fully inactive. Then, progressive transfers within a group weakly
increase its equilibrium winning probability.
Proof. Consider rst the case in subsection 5.1. There winning probabilities
are given by (10). Note that the ratio
yrk
Gr
is increasing in yrk : Then, since a
progressive transfer weakly increases yrk ; the winning probability p

k weakly
increases as a result. Now consider the case in subsection 5.2. There winning
probabilities are given by expression (11). Note that Gk is just the mean
of order  1 of the individual valuations. A progressive transfer makes it
increase. Because the ratio G

k
G is increasing in G

k, the same as above applies.
This result shows that in di¤erence-form group contests, members may
benet from engaging in income redistribution. Reducing the dispersion in
valuations makes the group relatively more successful. Part of this result
is driven by the convexity of the cost function. High valuations members
do not exert very high e¤ort since its marginal cost increase quite quickly.
A transfer given to a low valuation member induces a higher increase in
e¤ort than if it is received by a high valuation member. This is because the
marginal cost of e¤ort is lower for the low valuation member since she was
exerting a lower e¤ort than the high valuation one.
Finally, we would like to address the issue of relative success. We would
like to check whether more egalitarian groups are more likely to prevail.
In order to perform such comparisons, let us use the Atkinson index of
19
inequality (Atkinson,1970) which is dened as
I(yk) = 1 
y
k
k
;
where k is average valuation in group k and y
k
is just the mean of order
1    of the valuations: In Atkinsons formulation, the parameter   0 is
normative and measures the inequality aversion of the evaluator. It is equal
to zero when  = 0, i.e. y0
k
= k; and equal to the ratio
yk ynkk
yk
when
 ! 1: The Atkinson index can be used to compare distributions across
societies with di¤erent sizes and per capita incomes. Among its properties,
the index is normalized to be between zero and one, it satises the Pigou-
Dalton principle and it is consistent with the Lorenz dominance ordering.
Let us now use this index to state the following result. Before that, we
need to homogenize the inequality aversion parameter across groups. Hence
assume that k is identical across groups and denote 
 = 1   + : Then,
denote by k the average censored valuation in group k:
Proposition 10 (Inequality and success) Consider contests with hetero-
geneous groups with linear impact functions or in which all groups are either
fully active or fully inactive. Then, if I(yk) < I(y

l ) and 

k  l ; the
equilibrium winning probability of group k is higher than for group l.
Proof. Rewritting the Atkinson index yields
y
k
= yk(1  I(yk)) =
Y
nk
(1  I(yk));
where the last equality comes from our assumption that
Pnk
i=1 yik = Y for
all k: As a matter of fact, this is the expression for the Atkinson-Kolm-Sen
social welfare function (Sen, 1973). Hence, under the conditions stated in
the Proposition, it is clear that y
k
> y
l
.
By looking at (10) and (11) it is straightforward to see that group k
enjoys a higher probability of success than group l if and only if y
k
> y
l
and
Gk > G

l in each respective case. These are comparisons between means of
order order 1  =   + , where in the latter case it is assumed that  = 0:
Hence, the ranking y
k
> y
l
applies to them and allows us to conclude that
pk > p

l .
This result shows that given two groups of the same size, the more egal-
itarian group according to the Atkinson index is more likely to prevail in
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the contest. Because the index is consistent with the Lorenz criterion, the
Proposition contemplates as a particular case scenarios where the distrib-
ution in of the groups Lorenz dominates the other. Let us emphasize that
inequality is measured over the distribution of censored valuations. Hence,
the index is the same for two groups with very di¤erent distribution of val-
uations below the activity threshold but identical in every other respect.
The conclusion is that there exists strong forces in favor of egalitarianism
in di¤erence-form group contests. But this egalitarianism must apply to the
set of active members, which are the ones with higher valuations.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have o¤ered the rst systematic study of group contests
where groupswinning probabilities depend on the di¤erence between their
e¤ective e¤orts. These di¤erence-form group contests are well suited to
described a wide variety of situations where a set of groups compete for
an object or award. These include military combat, union-rm conicts,
inuence activities within organization and political lobbying within federal
countries.
Our rst result is that the non-existence of pure strategy equilibria and
the ensuing monopolization highlighted in the previous literature rest criti-
cally on the assumption of linear cost. This was to be expected. This lack of
robustness of the predictions under linear costs has been shown to apply as
well in other contests. Still, some groups can remain inactive in equilibrium
when costs are strictly convex. This is because the di¤erence-form CSF can
award a positive winning probability to inactive contenders. We see this
result as a realistic one. In many real instances contenders remain inactive:
Not all countries engage in warfare; neither all employees engage in inuence
activities.
The case of heterogeneous members extends this pattern inside groups.
Members with low enough valuations remain inactive in equilibrium. Again,
this seems to us a very realistic feature. We show in this case that inequal-
ity in mebersvaluations of victory is bad for a group. Unequal groups are
less likely to win the contest. It is important to reiterate that what mat-
ters there is inequality within the set of active members. Not all types of
redistribution within groups can enhance its chances of prevailing. Only
progressive transfers which make the active group more egalitarian or which
induce some inactive members to become active can lead the group to a
more likely victory.
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